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STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION OF
NONMEMBER BROKERS*
Although the regulation of securities transactions is primarily the responsi-
bility of the Securities and Exchange Commission,' the supervision of particu-
lar transactions in securities listed on a major stock exchange is the responsi-
bility of the particular exchange.2 When members of the exchange fail to ad-
here to "just and equitable principles of trade" in their dealings, the exchange
is required by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to discipline, suspend
or expel such members.3 Occasionally, however, an exchange will attempt to
regulate the practices of securities dealers who are not members but who rely
upon members for information and services. An exchange may, for example,
deny certain nonmembers its stock ticker service or enjoin exchange mem-
bers from having direct wire connections with those nonmembers. In such
cases an opportunity to refute the charges underlying the action is sometimes
denied.4 A recent attempt by a national securities exchange to discipline non-
members raises questions of statutory construction and constitutional limita-
tions.
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,5 the plaintiffs 6 challenged the
legality of certain disciplinary action taken against them by the Exchange.
In order to conduct business, plaintiffs arranged with a number of securities
dealers who were members of the Exchange for the installation of direct wire
service, and sought an agreement with the Exchange for installation of stock
ticker service. Under the rules of the Exchange, member firms could make
such arrangements only with the consent of the Exchange,7 and such approval
was temporarily granted for both the wire connections and the ticker service
in the fall of 1958. On February 12, 1959, without prior notice to the plaintiffs,
*Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
1. 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1958).
2. SHULTZ, THE SECURITIES MARKET 26-27 (1946).
3. 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1958).
4. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
5. 196 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
6. The Silver case was brought by three plaintiffs. They were: Municipal Securi-
ties Company, a nonmember over-the-counter securities dealer founded in 1956 and
dealing principally in municipal bond transactions; Municipal Securities Company, Inc.,
a nonmember over-the-counter dealer founded in 1958 for the purpose of trading in
unlisted corporate securities; and Harold Silver, owner of Municipal Securities Com-
pany and officer and principal shareholder of Municipal Securities Company, Inc.
7. CCHI, NYSE CONSTITUTION AND RULES 1056 (March 1959). Rule 355 of the
NYSE's Rules provides:
(a) No member or member organization shall establish or maintain any wire
connection, private radio, television or wireless system between his or its office
and the office of any non-member, or permit any private radio or television system
between his or its offices, without prior consent of the Exchange . . . . (e) The
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the Exchange denied their request for permanent ticker service, and also di-
rected member firms to disconnect wire service. Despite persistent efforts by
plaintiffs to elicit the reason for denial of their requests, the Exchange refused
to divulge the charges giving rise to its decision."
Plaintiffs then brought a treble damage action 9 alleging that disconnection
of wire service by order of the Exchange constituted a concerted refusal to
deal in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.10 They also alleged that
termination of stock ticker service was an illegal exercise of monopoly power
by the Exchange in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act,"- as well as a
concerted refusal to deal with plaintiffs in violation of section 1 of that act.
The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as it applied to
discontinuance of wire service, holding that such activity constituted a con-
certed refusal to deal. It permanently enjoined the Exchange from interfering
with plaintiffs' establishment of direct wire connections with member firms
and held that treble damages should be awarded to plaintiffs for any injuries
to their business. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
as it related to the other antitrust allegations, holding that these issues raised
Exchange may require at any time that any means of communication be dis-
continued.
Rule 356 of the NYSE's Rules provides:
The Exchange may require at any time the discontinuance of any means of
communication whatsoever which has a terminus in the office of a member or
member organization.
8. Initially the Exchange refused to disclose any reason which prompted it to take
the action unless the plaintiffs were willing to release the Exchange, its investigating
agencies, and its sources of information from libel or slander liability, or unless it was
directed to give its reasons by the court and thereby giving the charges privileged character
and insulating the Exchange from a subsequent suit, Neither the court nor the plaintiffs
would grant the Exchange's demands. Consequently, only four reasons were ever given
by the Exchange for its action-two of which relate essentially to plaintiffs' character.
These four reasons were: 1- The Exchange claimed that they had "scurrilous" informa-
tion about Silver and his wife but labeled it too confidential to disclose. 2- The Exchange
charged that the Silvers violated an agreement as to the disposal of shares of U.S.
Hoffman Machinery Corporation. 3- It claimed that the application of Municipal, Inc.
for approval of private wire connections and stock ticker service failed to list two
corporations asked for by the application. 4- The Exchange charged that the security
clearance of the Silvers and a corporation with which they were connected had been
suspended by the Department of Defense in 1953 under the Industrial Personnel Security
Program.
9. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
10. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). The part of this section which is
pertinent to the discussion of this case states in part that, "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
11. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). The part of this section which is per-
tinent to the discussion of this case states that it is illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations . .. ."
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disputed questions of fact. In response to defendant's argument that it was
exempt from antitrust liability because its conduct was prescribed by duties
and obligations imposed by the Securities Exchange Act, the court held
that neither the act nor its legislative history indicates a congressional intent
to grant power to national securities exchanges to regulate nonmember dealers.
The court found that the Exchange is not authorized "to exercise any power
beyond its own business in listed securities and the ethical conduct of its own
membership."'12 Moreover, the court rejected another defense argument that,
since the Exchange is subject to regulation by the SEC, it is exempt from the
antitrust laws at least to the extent that it is acting pursuant to SEC-ap-
proved rules requiring the action taken in this case. The court noted that the
rules of the Exchange were not affirmatively sanctioned by the SEC.13 It
also reasoned that if the defendant's contention were true a mechanism of ap-
peal to the SEC would likely have been provided. 14 Having found no "re-
pugnancy" between the regulatory provisions and the antitrust laws, the
court concluded that, under the doctrine of Fashion Originators' Guild v.
Federal Trade Commission,'r the defendant's acts constituted a concerted
refusal to deal which is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.'16
The initial inquiry of the district court concerned whether the action of the
Exchange was exempt from the Sherman Act. The first issue posed by
defendant's argument for exemption was whether an exchange's regulation of
over-the-counter security dealers is either a statutory duty imposed by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or is a duty emanating from SEC approval
of exchange rules regulating over-the-counter dealers.
In order for a national securities exchange to qualify for exemption from
antitrust liability, the court must find that Congress intended to vest the
exchange with duties which would be frustrated by application of the antitrust
laws. Congress, by expressly exempting certain regulatory duties imposed by
12. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. at 221.
13. Ibid.
14. In contrast to the provisions regarding national exchanges, the 1938 amendment
provides the procedure for review before the SEC for members of over-the-counter asso-
ciations who have been disciplined or aggrieved by refusal of membership. 52 Stat. 1070
(1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(9) (1958). The district court interpreted the presence of
this procedure for review in the 1938 amendment in the absence of any similar procedure in
the original act, to indicate that Congress was excluding national exchanges from a super-
visory position of over-the-counter dealers. 196 F. Supp. at 220. It seems, however, that
an interpretation conferring this same procedure for review in all areas of security regula-
tion would be more in keeping with the spirit of federal regulation. See SEC v. Joiner Corp.,
320 U.S. 344,350, 351 (1943).
15. 312 U.S. 457 (1941). The Fashion Originators' Guild attempted to destroy com-
petition from manufacturers who pirated designs of Guild members by refusing to sell to
retailers who sold such copied garments. The Supreme Court, applying the per se rule,
held that such an activity constituted illegal monopolistic practice.
16. From the judgment of the district court the New York Stock Exchange appealed
to the Second Circuit where the suit is now pending. (Letter from Sidney Dickstein to
the Yale Law Journal, October 6, 1961).
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statute, may specify that these duties supersede the antitrust laws. 17 The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, however, contains no provision insulat-
ing exchange activity from antitrust liability.'8 Therefore, a finding of ex-
emption must rest on an implied intent to exempt based on repugnancy be-
tween the antitrust laws and the duties imposed upon the exchange by
regulatory legislation. Moreover, the necessary repugnancy must be con-
spicuous. In Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,19 the Supreme Court rejected
the railroads' claim that as an industry subject to extensive regulation they
were exempt from the Sherman Act. The Court noted that "only a clear
repugnancy between the old law and the new results in the former giving way
and then only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy. -2 0
A primary purpose of Congress in enacting the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 was to protect the general investing public.21 The act states that:
transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities ex-
changes and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public
interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of
such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, including
transactions by officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require
appropriate reports, and to impose requirements necessary to make such
regulation and control reasonably complete and effective... and to insure
the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transaction. 22
17. The 1938 amendment to the Securities Exchange Act provides an example of
where Congress has created a statutory exemption from the antitrust laws. Section 15A(n)
provides:
If any provision of this section is in conflict with any law of the United States in
force on the date this section takes effect, the provision of this section shall prevail.
Thus any over-the-counter association filing under the provisions of this amendment are
afforded antitrust exemption. See 2 Loss, SEcumRIiEs REGULATION 1369 (2d ed. 1961).
18. The 1934 act which deals with national stock exchanges has no provision specifically
exempting stock exchanges from the application of other statutes. The 1938 amendment to
this act, however, provided that, in case of conflict with any other provision of any law,
this amendment shall prevail. 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3n (1958). See note
17 supra. The district court interpreted this exempting provision of the 1938 amendment
as excluding the rest of the act. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). It seems, however, that the court could have as easily interpreted this
exempting clause either to indicate full exemption for the entire act or that Congress
had already considered the 1934 act to be exempt when it came into conflict with other
laws.
19. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
20. Id. at 456-57.
21. Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238,244 (2d Cir. 1944).
22. 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1958). There are some thirty-six other
sections which refer to this same objective. They are: §§ 5, 6(a) (2), 7(d), 9(a) (6), 9(b),
9(c), 10(a), 10(b), 11(a), 11(b), 11(c), 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(d), 12(e), 12(f),
13(a), 14(a), 14(b), 15(b), 15(c)(3), 15(d), 15A(a)(1), 15A(b)(3), 15A(b)(4),
15A(b) (7), 15A(c), 15A(h) (2), 15A(j), 15A(k), 15A(1), 17(a), 19(a), 19(b), 24, 30,
78e, 78f(a) (2), 78g(d), 78i(a) (6), 78i(b)&(c), 78j (a)&(b), 78k(a)-(c), 781(b) (1)&(2),
781(d)-(f), 78m(a), 78n (a,b), 78o(b), 78o(c) (3), (d), 78o-3(a) (1), 78o (b) (3),(4),(7),
(c), 78o (h) (2), 78o(j-l), 78q(a), 78s (a)&(b), 78x, 78dd.
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Senate reports prior to passage of the act indicate that Congress recognized
that, in the absence of regulatory legislation, the exchanges had found it
impracticable to control nonmember dealers.23 This difficulty was cited to
indicate the need for a regulatory commission. While the act empowers the
SEC to regulate over-the-counter dealers,24 it cannot, however, be read to
abrogate the regulatory functions exercised by the exchanges. Indeed, in the
1938 amendment relating specifically to regulation of over-the-counter dealers
by dealers' associations,25 Congress again declined to specify that the regula-
tory powers of the SEC or any organization registering under the amend-
ment are exclusive. Since neither the 1934 act nor the 1938 amendment
evinces congressional intent to abrogate the authority of a national securities
exchange to regulate nonmember dealers, it is arguable that the act simply
provides additional regulation designed in part to control those over-the-
counter transactions that the exchanges cannot effectively supervise.
Among the conditions imposed upon an exchange by the act as a prereq-
uisite to registration with the SEC is the adoption of rules and practices that
are "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors."2
Under this broad statutory mandate, it would seem to follow that failure by
an exchange to enforce rules authorizing discipline of nonmember dealers
found to be conducting illegal or improper transactions involving members
would constitute a violation of law subjecting the exchange's registration to
SEC revocation.27 Moreover, it should be presumed that the SEC, entrusted
to effectuate the objectives of the act, approves only those rules and constitu-
tions of registering exchanges that are consistent with the regulatory scheme
envisioned by Congress. There is nothing in the act or legislative history that
prohibits the SEC from using a national exchange as a subordinate regulatory
body, and the acquiescence of the SEC to exchange rules designed to control
over-the-counter dealers associated with member firms suggests SEC incor-
poration of these rules into its own regulatory scheme. Moreover, since a na-
tional exchange is an institution sensitive to information regarding trading
23. S. REP. No. 792, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1934). This report resulted from the hear-
ings prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In noting the inability
of national exchanges to cope with all of the problems raised by over-the-counter dealers,
the report stated in part:
[t]he control exercised by stock exchange authorities is admittedly limited to their
own members, and they are unable to cope with those practices of nonmembers which
they deplore but cannot prevent.
24. 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1958).
25. 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1958).
26. 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1958).
27. The Securities Exchange Act provides that the Commission is authorized to with-
draw the registration of a national securities exchange if it finds that ". . . such exchange
has violated any provision of this chapter or of the rules and regulations thereunder or has
failed to enforce, so far as is within its power, compliance therewith by a member or by




misconduct in securities, it is probable that the SEC favors the exchange's in-
volvement in over-the-counter trading regulation in order that this source of
valuable information to the SEC is preserved. Therefore, the court in Silver
might have interpreted the Securities Exchange Act as imposing a duty on the
Exchange to enforce its rules against the plaintiffs; antitrust liability could
then have been deemed repugnant to this statutory duty.
A finding of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, however, would not have been determinative of the ex-
emption issue in this case. The court would also have to find that the very acts
giving rise to the alleged antitrust violation derived from the statutory duty.
Thus if the court found that the disciplinary action taken against plaintiffs was
unreasonable, it could have argued that since the act imposes no duty to
discipline beyond the bounds of reasonableness, such "ultra vires" activity
was not exempt from the application of the antitrust laws. The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 requires that the rules of a registered exchange be
"just."2 s Moreover, the SEC is required by the act to compel an exchange to
adopt rules which provide for the "fair administration of such exchange." 29
The preoccupation of Congress in 1934 with the need for broad legislation to
curtail trading abuses prevalent at that time precluded it from fashioning
procedural rules which would give content to the requirement of "just"
rules providing for "fair administration." But, when Congress addressed
itself for the first time to the task of drafting detailed securities legislation,
the 1938 amendment relating to over-the-counter securities required that
dealers be afforded a hearing before disciplinary action is taken by dealers'
associations. 30 Arguably, the 1938 amendment casts light upon the general re-
quirement in the 1934 act that disciplinary rules be just and conducive to the
fair administration of the exchange. If the hearings provision of the 1938
amendment is considered indicative of congressional intent of 1934 act pro-
visions relating to exchange rules, a hearing requirement should be read into
the disciplinary rules of the Exchange. Hence, the statutory duty of granting
a hearing would be placed upon the Exchange, and by implication would be
incorporated into its disciplinary rules. In such a case, a court might construe
a disciplinary rule approved by the SEC to contain a hearing requirement
despite the absence of explicit mention in the Exchange's rule. By adopting
this reasoning, the court in Silver might have concluded that, whether or not
a repugnancy existed between the antitrust laws and the disciplinary rule of
the exchange approved by the SEC, the Exchange did not act pursuant to such
rule because it denied a hearing implicit in the rule.
The court in Silver might have found still another reason for rendering its
inquiry more limited than the one actually adopted. To the extent that the
charges brought by the Exchange related to bare allegations of plaintiffs' bad
28. 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f (d) (1958).
29. 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1958).
30. 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (9) (1958).
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character,3 1 the disciplinary action taken may well have fallen outside the
proper regulatory scope of the Exchange. One charge upon which the Ex-
change acted was that plaintiffs had been denied security clearance for a brief
period by the Department of Defense.3 2 But neither the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 nor the SEC imposes a duty upon an exchange to apply approved
disciplinary rules in cases where the questionable character of a party is not
linked to misconduct, or the likelihood of misconduct, in securities trading. The
act suggests that Congress intended to create a regulatory scheme designed
only to prevent and remedy trading abuses, while the Exchange in Silver
seems to have acted partially in response to political considerations, 33 rather
than to a need to prevent or correct any trading misconduct by the plaintiffs.
Therefore, to the extent that the disciplinary action was taken because of plain-
tiffs' security status, it may be argued that such action was not sanctioned by
the 1934 act and could not be considered by the court as a basis for exempting
the Exchange from the antitrust laws.
Having found that the Exchange was not exempt from the application of
the antitrust laws, the court had little difficulty holding that the Exchange's
order to its members to discontinue wire service constituted a concerted re-
fusal to deal 34 with plaintiffs. Concerted refusals to deal, 35 along with price
fixing,3 6 division of markets,3T and tying arrangements, 38 have generally
31. See note 8 supra.
32. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 223.
35. Concerted refusals to deal are combinations formed to coerce third parties; they
have been held per se illegal regardless of their purpose. See, e.g., Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) ; United States v. Frankfort
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945). Cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) ; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See also
dicta in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953) ; United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948). But see Barber, Refusals to Deal
Under the Federal Anti-Trust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847,879 (1955).
36. Price fixing has been described as the most important of the per se offenses. ATr'y
GEN. NAT'L CoMms. ANTITRUST REP. 12 (1955). In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940), the Court held that "a combination formed for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a com-
modity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." See generally 1 TRUE REG. REP.
114020 (1961).
37. Market division agreements among competitors are held to be unreasonable because
of their character and necessary effect on competition. "They are agreements with no pur-
pose other than the elimination of competition.... ." ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST
REP. 26 (1955). Thus in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1999),
the Supreme Court held an agreement between competitors which tended to eliminate
competition illegal because prices were fixed from a division of the market among manufac-
turer which supplied about two-thirds of the cast-iron pipe market. See also Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), for a more recent condemnation of
market allocation between competitors.
38. Tying arrangements which condition the sale or lease of one product on use of
another are another type of conduct which has been placed in the per se category. See, e.g.,
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been considered illegal per se under the antitrust laws, thereby precluding any
further consideration of reasonableness. 39 However, an examination of what
courts have done when confronted with refusal to deal cases reveals that
they usually do consider the reasonableness of the restraint in determining
whether the practice should be upheld. If the court is convinced that the
defendant's activity bears little relation to a socially desirable goal, the label
"concerted refusal to deal" is attached and a per se violation exists. 40 If,
however, the court concludes that the questioned activity is reasonable, it
will often judiciously avoid use of a conclusionary term and will find no vio-
lation of the antitrust laws.41 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States42 is
illustrative. The Department of Justice attacked a rule of the Board of Trade
that members were prohibited from purchasing or offering to purchase grain
during the period between the close of the call and the opening of the next
business day at a price other than the closing bid at the call. The Government
alleged that this "call" rule amounted to price-fixing and constituted a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. Without once referring to the call rule as a
price-fixing agreement, the Supreme Court reversed the district court decision
that sustained the Government's contention, holding that the call rule consti-
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958). But see Note, 70 YALE L.J. 804 (1961).
39. The doctrine of per se illegality has been used by the courts to preclude the operation
of the rule of reason to practices falling into the categories of price fixing, division of markets,
group boycotts, and trying arrangements. Thus, if the prescribed conduct is labeled a per se
violation, "there is no inquiry into factual circumstances and economic data to determine
whether an agreement or practice constitutes a reasonable or an unreasonable restraint of
trade. Agreements or practices falling into this category are presumed to be unreasonable."
1 TRADE REG. REP. ff 500 (1961). See generally Note, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1136-40 (1949) ;
Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act, 10 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 302 (1942) (cases cited therein).
40. Commentators on the per se rule have reached similar conclusions but have des-
cribed the court's action in different terms. For example, Barber, supra note 35, at 872,
separated concerted refusals to deal into two groups. Those designed to coerce the conduct
of third parties or to secure their removal from competition were placed within the per se
category while those without this intent were not so labeled. He concluded that the real
issue in these cases "is not the existence or nonexistence of concerted refusal to deal, but
rather whether the purpose and effect of the operation of the contract, association, ex-
change or joint sales agency was such as unreasonably to exclude outsiders from participa-
tion in the trade in question." Id. at 877.
41. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), is one example
of a court testing the reasonableness of the action in what would otherwise be a concerted
refusal to deal. See also Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 70139
(D.D.C. 1961); Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
42. 246 U.S. 231 (1918) ; NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. (1960) states
in his commentary on the Chicago Board of Trade case that although market sharing is
illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act "it is, of course, possible that a set of
facts could be found or invented, such that it could be brought under the head of market-
sharing but not regarded as showing a significant restraint of trade, just as in the Chicago
Board of Trade case a set of facts which could be called price-fixing was found insignificant.
In this sense the Rule of Reason would come into play."
1962]
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tuted a reasonable regulation designed to prevent exploitation by traders who
acquired information after closing that would be available to all traders on the
Board the following day. The Court held that:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition .... The District
Court erred, therefore, in striking from the answer allegations concerning
the history and purpose of the Call rule and in later excluding evidence
on that subject.43
Even if the court in Silver followed the implications of Chicago Board of Trade,
it still could have found the Exchange's conduct unreasonable. First, the
Exchange was unable to prove the truth of charges underlying its order to
disconnect wire services; indeed, the court found such charges untenable.4"
Second, even if the Exchange had satisfied its burden of proving the truth of
the charges against plaintiffs, the denial of a hearing to plaintiffs required it
to take regulatory action on the basis of a one-sided and incomplete knowledge
of the facts. And, even assuming that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
authorizes the Exchange to exercise regulatory power in situations of this
type, it is unreasonable for the Exchange to exercise disciplinary power in the
absence of all the evidence relating to whether plaintiffs' dealings conflicted
with the objectives of securities legislation. Therefore, since the Exchange
precluded itself from a full understanding of the facts, the restraint of trade
in which it engaged was unreasonable and violative of the Sherman Act.
Thus far, it has been assumed that the courts are appropriate institutions
for trying cases similar to Silver, and that antitrust liability is a satisfactory
remedy. The repercussions of this decision upon securities regulation may,
however, be undesirable. If the Silver case is read broadly to prohibit a
national securities exchange from ever regulating nonmember dealers, it
would tend indirectly to limit the avenues through which the SEC could
regulate over-the-counter transactions. Since the securities legislation does not
specify any limitation on the means available to the SEC to regulate over-the-
counter transactions, the Silver case, by precluding the SEC from utilizing
the Exchange for this purpose, could unduly restrict the SEC's regulatory
powers. Moreover, even if the Silver decision is 'read narrowly to hold only
that the specific action taken against the plaintiffs was 'not a proper exercise
of a regulatory duty imposed upon the Exchange, the holding may still be
undesirable. Since an antitrust violation would render it liable for substantial
treble damages,45 the Exchange might be deterred from fully participating in
the area of over-the-counter regulation. Even if the Exchange rectified its un-
fair disciplinary procedure by providing a hearing, its decision to discipline
any given nonmember might still be challenged in a subsequent treble damage
action brought by the nonmember.
43. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238-39 (1918).
44. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. at 227.
45. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
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A requirement that the Exchange conduct a disciplinary hearing may be
found if the Exchange's regulation of securities practices is labeled a govern-
mental function subject to certain basic constitutional limitations.46 While the
guarantee of due process is a limitation only upon governmental action47
and an exchange is usually characterized as an unincorporated private asso-
ciation,48 the trend of judicial decisions has been toward enlarging the zone
of governmental activity by rendering private lawmaking groups subject to
due process requirements.4 9 The implications of calling an exchange a govern-
mental agency, however, may be much broader than a decision prescribing a
hearing would require. It is difficult to see where the courts would draw
46. In re Central R.R., 136 F.2d 633, 639 (3d cir. 1943). The court in this railroad
reorganization proceeding noted that
The right to notice and a hearing is one of ancient origin and by the due process
clauses of the 5th and 14th amendments has been safeguarded to all against depriva-
tion by the federal government and the states respectively.
For the application of the due process clause to administrative proceedings of a
quasi-judicial character, see Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
47. The fifth amendment is a limitation only upon the powers of the government, and is
not directed against the action of individuals. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330
(1926).
The fourteenth amendment has also been held to apply only to the action of state
governments and not against the action of private groups or individuals. Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
48. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. at 210.
49. Beginning with the creation of the American federal system in 1789, and especially
following the enactment of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, more and more govern-
mental activity has been made subject to due process limitation. Miller, The Constitutional
Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN. L. REv. 620, 664 (1958), states that the democratic
process has always had the problem of curbing the excesses of private groups. He asserts
as his basic premise that "governing power, wherever located, should be subjected to the
fundamental constitutional limitation of due process of law." Id. at 663.
The application of the due process clause to curb these "excesses of private groups"
has been employed by the Supreme Court in several recent cases. In Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court held that the judicial enforcement by state courts of a
restrictive covenant between private individuals which discriminated against Negroes
made the state court a guilty partner in the racial discrimination and therefore violated the
fourteenth amendment. In the area of primary election, the Court in Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944), held that the Texas Democratic Party, a private voluntary association
which had excluded Negroes, was subject to the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
because its recognition and use by the state to aid in the selection of candidates made its
conduct governmental action. Still again in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the
Supreme Court held that action by a town owned by a private corporation was limited by
the due process clause because of its essential similarity to a publicly controlled town.
Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 Coiu.
L. REv. 155, 176 (1957), has suggested that power wherever located should be subject
to the fundamental constitutional limitations of due process of law. He states:
The corporate organizations 6f business and labor have long ceased to be private
phenomena. That they have a direct and decisive impact on the social, economic, and
political life of the nation is no longer a matter of argument. It is an undeniable fact
of daily experience. The challenge to the contemporary lawyer is to translate the
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the line in holding persons affected by such groups entitled to the guarantees
afforded by the Constitution. Therefore, while courts may be able to impose
an affirmative duty upon an exchange to hold hearings, even in the absence of
legislation creating such a duty, the problems inherent in both the due process
and the antitrust approaches speak strongly for an alternative means of
insuring fairness in an exchange's disciplinary procedure.
The deficiencies inherent in the antitrust and due process approaches can
be avoided by adoption of a procedure similar to that sanctioned by Congress
in the 1938 amendment to the Securities Exchange Act.60 This amendment
required that over-the-counter dealers' associations provide hearings in all
disciplinary proceedings 51 and that the SEC decide appeals from the asso-
ciation's decision. 52 Thus, Congress seems to have felt that a disciplinary
procedure consisting of a hearing and a right to appeal to the SEC for review
was most promotive of the goals of securities regulation.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 may be read to authorize the SEC
to promulgate rules requiring a hearing whenever an exchange attempts to
discipline over-the-counter dealers. This act directs the SEC to make "such
rules and regulations as may be necessary for the execution of the functions
vested in [it] by this chapter.15 3 Since one of the SEC's functions is to insure
the fair administration of an exchange's activities,5 4 promulgation of a hear-
ings rule to be complied with by the exchanges would be proper. And, if an
exchange failed to adhere to the SEC rule by denying a hearing to over-the-
counter dealers in disciplinary proceedings, the SEC is authorized by statute
to suspend or revoke the exchange's registration.55 Moreover, if a provision
is included in the SEC rule allowing for an appeal to the SEC by nonmember
dealers who have been denied a hearing, still another objective of the 1938
amendment can be incorporated into the field of exchange regulation.56 By
providing in the 1938 amendment for an appeals mechanism to the SEC from
decisions of a dealers' association, Congress seems to have intended that court
involvement be postponed until disputes of this nature have been considered by
the SEC. Providing an appeals mechanism to the SEC for over-the-counter
dealers denied a hearing in exchange disciplinary proceedings would, under the
social transformation of these organizations from private associations to public
organisms into legal terms.
See generally HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW (1952) ; PEKELIS, LAW AND SOCIAL AcTIo N
(1950) ; and Wirtz, Governnzent by Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REv. 440 (1953).
50. The 1938 amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 providing, among
other things, a procedure for review and appeal in disciplinary actions for over-the-counter
associations registering under the amendment, does not apply to exchanges. See note 14
supra and accompanying text.
51. 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (9) (1958).
52. 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h) (1958).
53. 48 Stat. 901 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1958).
54. 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1958).
55. 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (1) (1958).
56. See note 50 supra.
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doctrine of primary jurisdiction, preclude the type of suit brought in the Silver
case until the SEC has had an opportunity to review the exchange's conduct.5r
The SEC would be free, therefore, to weigh the exchange's actions in the light of
regulatory policies, and would not encounter the problems that face a court when
the denial of a hearing is couched in terms of an antitrust violation or an
abridgment of due process.
57. If the court adopted a solution employing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
situations like that in Silver would gain the advantage of administrative expertise while
at the same time avoid the awkwardness of forcing the SEC to file amicus curiae briefs
with federal courts to express opinions on pending suits. See BNA, ANTITRUST TRADE Ra.
REP., Dec. 5, 1961, p. 11. For general treatment of primary jurisdiction and antitrust
problems, see 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 19.05, at 23 (1958).
